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Studies on the economic and political determinants of civil wars have revealed
that once a civil  war has  started, its termination depends critically on the balance of
military capability between  the government and the rebels.  That balance  is  at least
partially  determined  by  the  rebels'  cohesion  and  their  ability  to  resist  government
attempts to divide them into rival  factions.  A debate still is ongoing  on the relative
significance  of the  various  determinants  of that  balance  of  capabilities between  the
government  and  rebel  organizations.  In  this  paper,  we  will  focus  on  two  such
determinants which we consider very important: external interventions and the degree of
ethnic fragmentation of the society; and we will consider the impact of these variables on
the length of civil wars.
One influential  argument in the  literature is that  the duration of  civil wars is
positively, though non-monotonically related to the level of ethnic fractionalization of the
warring  society  (Collier,  Hoeffler,  and  Soderbom,  1999).  The  implication  is  that
polarized societies would generate longer civil wars because the cost of coordinating a
rebellion for a long enough period could be prohibitively high in very diverse societies.
The authors corroborate this argument in an empirical model of civil war duration using
survival analysis of a large number of countries over the 1960-95 period.  Importantly,
they find that economic and political variables which other authors have identified as
important for the initiation and overall incidence of civil war do not have an important
impact on war duration.  They therefore argue that war initiation and war duration are
two distinct phenomena that deserve individual study.
Building on that important paper, Elbadawi (1999) elaborated a dynamic model of
duration, in which he considered if external intervention --a variable not considered in
Collier et al.-- has an effect in civil war duration.  He argued that external intervention in
favor of the rebels may have the effect of reducing the cost of sustaining a rebellion by a
small ethnic group, which otherwise might not materialized or may be quickly crushed by
the government.  Therefore, in the presence of external intervention social polarization is
not necessary as a cause of longer-lasting civil wars 9which was the principal finding of
Collier  et al.).  Rather, external intervention could reduce  the cost  of coordinating a
rebellion for  a  given level of  ethnic  fractionalization, thereby increasing  the  ease of
mounting a rebellion and leading to longer-lasting wars.  Because external intervention
(in favor of the rebels) causes an upward shift in the hazard function of war for any given
level of ethnic fractionalization, socially diverse and previously "safe"  societies could
become vulnerable to a higher incidence of longer civil wars.
In  this  paper,  we  take  the  Elbadawi  (1999)  paper  a  step  forward,  further
developing the  theoretical model  and testing its propositions  against a  panel data-set
which  combines  variables  on  war  attributes and  other  socio-economic  and  political
characteristics of  161 countries.  We  use preliminary  data on  external interventions
Iconstructed by Regan (2000) and we argue that external intervention is one of the major
determinants of civil war determinants.
In  section  2,  we  present our  theoretical  framework,  linking war  duration  to
external intervention.  In section 3, we present some stylized facts and summary statistics
associated with civil wars and external intervention in a global sample covering the 1960-
1998 period.  In section 4, we estimate a model of external intervention, where we predict
the likelihood of intervention based on a set of determrinants  in countries which  are at
war.  Unlike  other studies,  we  argue that  intervention  is  inherently  an  endogenous
variable and therefore we do not  include it as an exogenous regressor in  our duration
model, which we develop in section 5.  In section 5, which contains our core empirical
analysis, we therefore use expected, rather than current, external intervention as a key
determinant of civil war duration.  Our empirical analysis is based on ordered probit
regressions.'  We conclude in section 6 with some suggestions for farther study.
2.  Theory
Civil war occurrence and duration may be modeled as the result of a forecast error
on the part of the rebels or the state with reference to each other's  military capability. 2
Unlike  international  wars,  which  are  usually  short-lived,  civil  wars  are  prolonged.
According  to  the  argument  above,  this  would  mean  that  either  the  rebels,  or  the
government, are over-optimistic about their relative military capability, leading to errors
in judgement that prolong wars.  The duration of the war is basically determined by the
ability of the rebel movement to remain intact, sustain itself, and avoid military defeat.
What are some of the determinants of the rebels' ability to sustain their movement
for long periods of time?  Collier et al. argue that one important element is the degree of
ethnic fragmentation in the society.  They argue that very polarized societies produce
longer wars because in  such societies the rebels can more easily mobilize and sustain
support among their ethnic group, which constitutes a sufficiently large segment of the
country to provide the necessary support.  The authors explain that during the course of
the war, the  government will  try  to  divide the rebel  movement and  win  over  some
factions to  its  side.  In  homogenous  societies,  rebel  cohesion  is  likely  to  be  more
vulnerable to  such  government  attempts, given  the  lack  of  strong  socio-cultural  or
religious divide between the two  camps.  Moreover, for the case of diverse societies,
maintaining the unity of a movement composed of diverse groups is likely  to become
I We have  used ordered  probit analysis  as a first cut to the analysis  of the determinants  of civil  war
duration (see section 5).  In the revised version of the paper, we plan to use survival analysis models.
2  See Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 1999.  A similar theoretical argument regarding international war is
developed by Fearon 1995.
2harder over time.  This leaves the case of polarized societies, for which rebellion can be
sustained for a longer period.  The authors also simulated the probability of duration and
find  that  there is  a high  probability that  a  civil  war  will  end  during  its  first  year.
However,  should the war  continue beyond  the  first year, the  probability of peace  is
radically lower for subsequent years. 3
Though useful, the insight of Collier et al. does not take into considerations the
dynamic and strategic interactions among the warring parties.  By contrast, a theoretical
framework proposed by Intriligator and Brito (1988 -- hereafter IB), accounts for these
two  features  by  analyzing  the  determinants  of  the  rates  of  growth  of  rebel  and
government forces over time. 4 In this paper, we will use IB theory as a basis for deriving,
in the context of our two period framework, the probability that a civil war, once started,
continues into the next period: Pr (D > 0).
Denoting the sizes of rebel and government forces at time t by  nr  (t)  and  ng (t),
respectively,  and  the  size  of  population  living  in  territories  under  rebel  control  by
pop,  (t),  lB state the following three differential equations describing the evolution of
the three variables over time:
(1)  nr  = OZrIPOPr  -72ng)nfr  I  ,ri12  >0
(2)  nfg  = (73  - )r 4 fnr)ng  . T3 ,  )4  >  0
(3)  PoPr  =)r5nr  -6ng,  9,5 ,76  >0
The first equation of motion suggests that the growth in rebel forces over time
depends positively on the interaction of this force with the population under its control
and negatively  on  its  interaction with  the  government forces.  The second  equation
suggests that the growth in the size of government army depends positively on its initial
size and negatively  on its  interactions with rebel  forces.  Finally, the  third equation
assumes that the growth of the size of population living under rebel  controls depends
positively on the size of the rebel forces and negatively on the size of government forces.
3  They  explain  this as a consequence  of "the  systematic  over-optimism  of rebels which  would  be predicted
by random errors in estimates of the costs and benefits of rebellion. Many wars are mistakes,  which do not
produce rebel victory but rather military stalemate.  Stalemates can be ended by negotiated settlements, but
these encounter a time-consistency problem, with the government being unable credibly to commit to
settlement terms.  As a result, military stalemates persist" (Collier, Hoeffler, Soderbor,  1999, 17).
4The  representation of IB's theoretical framework is based on a review article by Sandler and Hartley
(1995).  See also Brito and Intriligator (1989, 1992).
3The steady state and the corresponding phase diagram, depicting behavior along
and around the steady state, are described by the following six equations:
(4)  nr =  O  if  g  =  i'  =  ',  for n  > 0
POP,  oZ2
(5)  ng =0  if  n, =  - =  i',for  ng >0
)T4
(6)  n,  >O  if  fg  ><f'
P°Pr . ~~n.
(7)  n,  <0  if  <)r'
(8)  ngg>0  if  n,  >z,
(9)  ng  <0  if  nr  <  r,
where  or'  denotes the  critical ratio  of  the  size of  government forces  to  the  size  of
population living under rebel controls for there to be no change in the size of rebel forces,
while 7f" indicates the critical size of the rebels forces consistent with a stationary size of
the government army.  Equations (4) -(9)  give rise to a phase diagram in the  (n,,ng)
space  (see  Sandler  and  Hartley,  1995:  Figure  13.1), which  we  reproduce  here  for
convenience.  Both of phases II and IV are associated with short wars, where phase II
(IV)  suggests  a  quick  government  (rebels)  victory,  due  to  the  rapid  expansion  of
government (rebel) arrny while the rebels (government) forces shrink at the same rapid
pace.  On the other hand phases I and HII  are consistent with longer and stalemated wars,
where in phase I (III) both forces shrink (expand) over time.  We expand this framework
in  two  important dimensions, recommended by  Sandler and  Hartley  (1995)  in  their
review article, by introducing uncertainty and by allowing the sizes of the phases (i.e. the
probability events) to depend on behavioral determinants.
The four phases of the diagram can be expressed in terms of four events, which
determine the probability of duration of war:
I:  A, (i7;oPr,,if)  = {ng  > gPoPr,nr > if"}
(-_)  (-)
II:  A 2(rloPr,,;i)  {Ing  >  ;opr,nr<  7r}
III:  A 3(7iPoPr,i")  =  {ng < 7:opr,nfr<  if"}
(+)  (+)
IV:  A 4 (OOpr,  ')=  {fng  <  O°Pr,nfr>fT"}
4In the context of our two-period framework (where we characterize short wars as
those  that  end  in  the  same  period  and  do  not  spill  over  into  the  following  one):
p, (D = 0) = p, (A2 u  A4)  and p, (D > 0) = Pr (Al u  A 3) . Both probability statements
could in turn be written as functionals of  (7ZPoPr',),  albeit for both functionals the net
effect of these parameters could not be  a priori signed.  In the interest of  analytical
tractability, we will assume that the relevant event for determining the probability of
stalemated civil war is A3 . Even though this assumption is subject to empirical testing,
the prediction of this event that over time the sizes of the two armies in stalemated wars
tend to grow (rather than shrink as predicted by  A1) appears to be more consistent with
most actual civil war experiences.  With this assumption, we write:
(10)  p,(D  > 0) = Pr[A 3 (4PProp,7")]
Figure 1: Phase Dynamics of Predator-Prey Guerrilla Warfare Model
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Source:  Figure  13.1  of Sandler  and  Hartley  (1995)
5The parameter  (Top°r)  is influenced by  factors that  determine effectiveness of
rebels' recruitment operations and the sympathy of certain segments of the population to
tne rebels' cause.  In addition, it is also partially determined by factors that influence the
capability of the  rebel fighting force relative to  that of  the government forces  (e.g.,
relative availability of resources to pay for soldiers' salaries and training or for purchases
of arns).  To fix the discussion we write the following specification for (°rvopr):
(11)  7TZPPr  = f  {elf, el  * ext, ext * J(rights  J),(rights e),ef2,  x,  ext},
where the latter set of factors are proxied by the ratio of the flow of natural resources
controlled by rebels relative to  real GNP (Xr),  where  GNP is assumed to  reflect the
government's overall spending ability.  The rest of the factors are assumed to influence
the sympathy of the population with, and recruitment effectiveness of, the rebels.  Ethnic
fractionalization (elf)  helps the rebels on both counts.  However, as in  the case of
hazard of war  theory, too  much ethnic fractionalization could negatively affect  both
objectives: hence (elf
2 ) enters negatively.  The direct effect of external intervention in
favor of the rebels (ext)  is expected to raise rebel capability from relatively weaker initial
levels and hence is expected to lead longer duration of conflicts.  On the other hand, the
interaction effect of external interventions in the presence of ethnic diversity (elf  * ext)
could not be a priori signed. 5 However, we expect the net effect of external intervention
to lead to longer duration. Finally, the variables 6(rightso )  and  ext * i5(rights' ) (where
c5(...)is  an indicator function) suggest that if government repression exceeds a  certain
threshold  (rights@)it tends to reduce duration of civil wars by raising the penalty  for
rebel  sympathizers  and  thus  hampers  rebels'  recruitment  efforts,  while  external
interventions (in favor of the rebels) would even up the effect of extreme autocracy by
lowering the penalty threshold.
The remaining parameter (zr')  depends on factors that determine the initial stock of
govermnent forces in addition to the factors that influence capabilities of the government
forces relative to those of the rebels.  We specify the stock of government forces to be
positively dependent on the total size of population in the country (pop)  and the relative
effectiveness of government forces to be a positive function of per capita income ( y):
5  However,  the implication  of this model  for the effect  of external  intervention  on the probability  of
duration  of civil  wars is not as straight  forward  as the case  of the hazard  of civil  wars. The concept  of
intervention  we adopt  here is in terms  of "net" intervention,  which  implies  that external  interventions  in
favor  of the government  should  reduce  duration. This,  however,  may run  counter  to some  prelimninary
evidence,  which  suggests  that  interventions  in favor  of governments,  rebels  or both  tend  to lengthen  intra -
state conflicts (Regan, 1996,  98, 2000). Again the model can accommodate a broader definition of
interventions  that  allows  interventions  in favor of government  to enter  separately  from  those in favor  of the
rebels.
6(12)  ,ir"  = g(pop,  y) -
Now equations (10)-(12) allow statement of the following expression for the probability
of stalemated civil wars:
(13)  p,(D  > 0) = pD{elf  eflf*ext,ext*S(rightso),6(rights@),elf 2,ext,x",pop,  y}.
(+  (?  (+)  (-  (_)  ( )  (+)  (t,)  (+)
3.  Characteristics  of Civil Wars  and External  Interventions
Before attempting to undertake formal empirical analysis of the determinants of
civil wars duration, we should briefly discuss some of the characteristics of these wars as
well as the frequency and type of external interventions.  The two panels of Figure 2
present the mean number of five-year periods during which a war took place in each of
six regions of the world for the periods 1960-98 and 1980-98, respectively.  They also
present relative indices of the mean war duration, war-related deaths, democracy levels,
and ethnic heterogeneity for these six regions.
Figure 2 points to an interesting geographical distribution of war.  Africa has the
highest incidence of civil war, especially if we combine the incidence of war in  Sub-
Saharan and North Africa. Perhaps more to the point, the incidence of war has increased
in the last two decades in Africa, while it has fallen or remained stagnant in other regions
(see the first column of Figure 2).6  However, wars in Africa are on average relatively
short and they tend to be among the bloodiest (see columns 2 and 3 of Figure 2).  They
are therefore the most intense civil wars (in terms of casualties per unit of time).  Only
Asia has seen more war-related deaths than Africa in the last 40 years and this estimate
need not include all civilian war-related deaths that were due to starvation, illness, and
other disruptions caused indirectly by war in Africa.
Column 4 of Figure 2 also reveals a huge discrepancy in the democracy levels in
Sub-Saharan  and  North  Africa  as  compared  to  most  other  regions  (Europe, North
America, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia).  Finally, column 5 of Figure 2
reveal that Africa (especially Sub-Saharan Africa) includes the most  ethnically diverse
countries than  any other region in the world.  These facts lend itself to  speculation
concerning a positive association between ethnic heterogeneity and political violence in
Africa.  However, few analysts have tried to explore that relationship in depth and even
fewer have considered the possible role of Africa's relative lack of political rights and its
6  We analyze  the incidence  of civil  war  in Africa  in greater  detail  in Collier,  Elbadawi,  and Sambanis
(2000b).
7overall lower level of economic development in exacerbating any conflict that ma y result
from its greater ethnic diversity.
Conflicts and External Interventions
As  pointed  out  by Regan  (2000, chapter  2),  attaining  a  coherent  and  useful
definition of foreign intervention is complicated by the need to understand the nature of
the conflict that underlies the intervention, as well as by the need to  account  for the
complex mix of factors that can shape an intervention strategy.  That strategy can consist
of either punishments or rewards (or both), and can range from incremental policies to
massive onslaughts and may assist the government or support the rebellion.  Our guide to
overcome these complexities will be Regan (2000). We will define external intervention
as a unilateral intervention by one (or more) third party government(s) in a civil war in
the form of military, economic or mixed assistance in favor of either the government or
the rebel movement involved in the civil war.  This model of interventions is biased in
favor  of  one  of the two parties  involved in  the intra-state conflict.  We  distinguish
between such partial interventions and what we call the "external agency" interventions,
which are multilateral and essentially neutral, aiming at impartial resolution of conflicts
(e.g., peacekeeping, peacemaking).  We will argue in this paper that the two modes of
intervention are very different in terms of their potential impacts on conflicts.
Figure  2 (1 of 2 Panels)
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8Figure  2 (2 of 2 panels)
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We  use  Regan's  index  of  external intervention:  a  binary  variable,  indicating
whether or not interventions have taken place in a given conflict.  However, the index is
rich enough to account for modes of interventions (military, economic, mixed) and target
of  interventions  (government,  opposition).  In  addition,  this  index  disaggregates
intervening third  parties by  country  and by  whether  the intervention  is  unilateral  or
multilateral.7 Preliminary analysis of Regan's  data suggests the following patterns (see
Figure 3A). 8
7Some  of the sources that Regan used to develop his data set are among the well known databases in this
literature: Correlates of Civil War database (Singer and Small, 1994), the Annual Yearbook of the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Keesings Contemporary Archives (cited in
Regan,  2000),  The  New  York  Times  , and  the  Minorities  at Risk  Project.  In  addition  he  cites  Herbert
Tillema  (1991,  cited  in  Regan),  Person  and  Baumann  (1993,  cited  in  Regan)  and  a host  of  case-specific
historical  documents  as sources  for  the  construction  of  the  "external  interventions"  indexes.
g  Figure  3A  is  based  on  a new  data  set  developed  by  Regan  (2000),  who  constructs  consistent  indexes  of
indexes  for  intra-state  conflicts  as  well  as  for  external  interventions  going  back  as  far  as  1944.  Unlike  most
well  known  defrnitions  of  conflicts  that  requires  1000  casualties  for  a conflict  to  qualify  as  a civil  war  (e.g.,
Singer  and  Small,  1994),  Regan  defines  intra-state  conflict  as  "armed,  sustained  combat  between  groups
within  state  boundaries  in  which  there  are  at  least  200  fatalities."  Regan  argues  that  by  lowering  the
threshold  to  less  than  a thousand  this  definition  captures  the  seriousness  of  the  conflict,  yet  the  threshold  is
high  enough  to  exclude  events  such  as  "bloodless"  coups,  riots  and  demonstrations.  However,  the  version
of  the  data  set  we  have  is,  in  fact,  not  significantly  different  from  an  updated  data  base  based  on  Collier,
Elbadawi  and  Sambanis  (2000a,  b).
9Out of 138 intra-state conflicts since 1944, 89 attracted external interventions by at
least one external third party.  Within the 89 cases, if repeated interventions were taken
into  account  the  total  number of  interventions  amounts to  190,  of  which  76  were
accounted for by major powers.  The countries with the dubious distinction of having the
highest number of interventions are: USA (35), Former USSR/Russia (16), France (10),
UK (9), China (6) and Cuba (5). Out of the 190 interventions, only 57 have led to an end
in the fighting.
External interventions are associated with longer-lasting wars.  A scatter diagram
of war  duration and external interventions during  1960-99 for all countries that have
experienced civil wars reveals an upward-sloping relationship (Figure 3.B).  Moreover,
the  mean  duration  of  civil  wars  that  were  terminated  and  which  had  external
interventions was nine years; while those wars that were terminated but did not have an
intervention had a mean duration of only 1.5 years (Figure 3.C).
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114.  Explaining External Interventions in Civil Wars
The  preliminary analysis in  the  previous section suggests that  a  positive
association exists between external intervention  and civil war duration. However, this
evidence does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship. It may be the case that
causality runs in the opposite  direction  and interventions  may occur only in wars that are
already long-lasting. To  the extent  that external  intervention  is indeed  endogenous  to war
duration, expected rather than current levels of  external interventions should be the
appropriate explanatory  variable in an empirical model of duration consistent with the
theory of section  2.
We therefore  estimate  a simple  empirical  model of external  interventions  and we
assume that the probability  of intervention  is positively influenced  by the length of war
duration,  as reflected  by the date of initiation  of the conflict (at_war). Also we assume
that the costlier the war ( in terms of lives lost -- cost), the higher the probability of
intervention. We also include a dummy  for ethnic  wars (ethwar)  as well as indicators  of
the extent  of ethnic fractionalization  (elf, elf*elf), where a non-monotonic  relationship  is
assumed, based on Collier et al.  Our prior is that Ethwar (as well as elf) should be
negatively  associated  with the probability  of external  intervention. This reflects the view
that these are wars talking place in relatively  marginal  and non-strategic  countries  hence,
ceteris  paribus, these wars would  attract  little external  intervention. We also assume that
external  intervention  is less likely in countries  with strong  military capabilities  (Imilp) or
in a region with high standards  of democracy  (Regd)  and in countries  with very "deep"
(i.e. high-scoring)  democracies. 9
To avoid endogeneity  problems,  all explanatory  variables  (except elf and Ethwar,
which are time-invariant)  are lagged.  The results, based on a random effects probit
model, are contained  in Table 1. The evidence  strongly  corroborates  our framework  and
suggest  the following  conclusions. First, external  intervention  is more likely in bloodier
wars or when the government  fighting  the civil war is more democratic. Second,  there is
equally  robust evidence  suggesting  that intervention  is less likely  to occur in ethnic wars,
though the degree of ethnic fractionalization  is not robustly associated  with external
intervention. Third, external intervention  is also less likely in civil wars where regions
are characterized  by high levels of democracy  or when the state involved  in the civil war
has a strong  military.
9  To estimate  this  model  and our model  of war duration,  we use data developed  by Sambanis  (2000). This
is a cross-sectional  time-series  data-set  of 161  countries  between  1960-1999  with annual  frequency. See
Sambanis  (2000) for a discussion  of the variables  in question.
12Table 1: Random Effects Probit Model of External Intervention
Dep. Var:  Intervention  Coefficient  Standard  Error  P> ZI
Regressors:
Deaths & displacements (log)  5.  90e-06  1.  75e-06  0.  001
(Cost)
Was it an ethnic war?  -1.  915  .4325  0.000
(ethwar)
Military personnel (lagged once)  -. 0 0357  .00087  0.000
(Imilpil)
Area affected by conflict  -.2105  .1486  0.157
(Magarea)
Lagged dumnmy  for "deep" democracies  2.  :51  .5572  0.  000
(Dpdemnll)
Regional democracy average (lagged once)  -.  463  .1042  0.  000
(Regdll)
Dummy variable for region  .4542  .1282  0.000
(geo)
Variable indicating war in previous period  1. 309  .3898  0.001
(at_  warll)
Constant  -.045  .925  0.961
lnsig2u  2.293669  .305391  0.000
LR test of rho=0  Chi2(1)=260.33  Prob>chi2=0.00
Observations  508
Number of groups  51
Log-Likelihood  -98.386
Wald  chi2(8)  45.78
Using  the  results  of Table  1, we  generate  the  predicted  probability  of  external
intervention,  which  we  subsequently  use  as  an  explanatory  variable  in  the  empirical
model  of war duration  which  we analyze  next.
5.  An Ordered Probit Model for Duration of Civil Wars
Using  equation  13 of the model  of section  2 as a guide  for our  empirical  analysis,
we  estimate  an ordered  probit  model  of the duration  of  civil  wars  (see  results  in  Table
2).10  Our dependent  variable  is war  duration  categories  -- an  ordered  variable  coded  in
three  intervals  according  to the  quartiles  of a continuous  variable  measuring  war  duration
in  months.  Our  regressors  include  a  lagged  index  of  autocracy  (autoll);  an  index  of
ethnolinguistic  diversity  (elf; elJ2); the  expectation  of external  intervention  (phint); the
log of population  size, lagged  once (poplagl);  a variable  coded  1 if the war was an ethnic
10 We divided  the data in four ordered  duration  categories,  based  on the quartile  ranges  of that variable.
We included  ongoing  wars  and computed  their  war duration  up to the present,  although  a more  correct
approach would have been to drop ongoing wars and analyze only wars that have ended.  We included
ongoing  wars  because  we eventually  plan to use duration  analysis  to estimate  our model. War categories
are ordered from shortest duration to longest duration.
13war and 0 otherwise (ethwar); a control variable for the cold war (coldll);  and a number
of interaction terms (see below).  The estimation results corroborate the key predictions
of the duration model of section 2.
First, ethnic fractionalization (elf) is positively, but non-monotonically associated
with  war  duration.  The  inverted  U-shape  relationship  is  fairly  robust  and  highly
significant, which confirms the main insight from Collier et al. that prolonged civil wars
are usually associated with ethnically polarized societies.  However, unlike these authors,
who find only ethnic fractionalization to be robustly associated with duration, we find
other significant relationships as well.  We find that war duration is robustly  associated
with  external  intervention,  war  type,  the  war's  cost  in  terms  of  casualties  and
displacements, and with the level of political oppression in the country.
Table 2: Ordered  Probit  Regressions  On Civil War Duration
(Robust  standard  errors  reported  in parentheses)
Dep. Var.:  War  Duration  Category  Regression  2a  Regression  2b  Regression  2c
Regressors:  Regresswn_2a_  Regression_2b_Regression_2c
Autocracy  index  (lagged  once)  -. 1732  -. 224*  =.229*
(autoll)  (.112)  (.122)  (.123)
Ethnolinguistic  diversity  index  .121*  .189**  .188**
(Elf)  (. 063)  (.054)  (.055)
ELF index squared  -. 0012**  -. 002**  -. 0018**
(Elf2)  (.0006)  (.0005)  (.0005)
Expected  external  intervention  .532*  1.38**  1.39**
(Ph3int)  (.3106)  (.579)  (.582)
Log  of population  size lagged  once  .332  .333  .339
(logpopll)  (.388)  (.374)  (.372)
Dunmy  variable  for  ethnic  wars  2.26**  2.11**  2.09**
(Ethwar)  (.596)  (.592)  (.597)
Interaction  tern: Phint  *  elf  -. 0052  -. 054**  -.055**
(Phielf)  (.0057)  (.026)  (.026)
Interaction  term:  Phint * e1j2  .0005*  .0005*
(Phielf2)  (.0003)  (.0003)
Interaction  term:  Phint *  cost  -2.  64e-07*
(phico)  (1.57e-07)
Interaction  term: Phint * dall  .452*  .522**  .530**
(phidall)  (.246)  (.231)  (.231)
Cold  War  (lagged  once)  -.  265  -. 204
(coldll)  (.296)  (.323)  _
Observations:  438  438  438
Log likelihood:  -507.08839  -498.58128  -498.9541
Pseudo R2:  0.1120  0.1269  0.1262
Ancillary Parameters:
_cutl  7.62  8.86  9.09
(6.1)  (6.3)  (6.2)
cut2  9.31  10.61  10.83
(6.16)  (6.37)  (6.26)
_cut3  11.62  12.94  13.15
(6.38)  (6.51)  (6.39)
** Denotes  significance  at .05 level;  * denotes  significance  at .1 level
14Specifically, we find first, that ethnic wars are generally longer than other types of
civil war, since the coefficient of ethwar is robustly significant and positive.  This finding
is in agreement with much of the political science literature which tends to argue that
ethnic wars are harder to resolve (e.g., Kaufnann  1996).
Second, we find  expected extemal intervention (Phint) to have  a positive and
highly  significant association with  war duration.  The estimated coefficient  is highly
significant and  stable (ranging from 1.33 to  1.38 in the three variations of the model
specification we present in Table 2).  This level of impact would more than outweigh the
interaction effects of intervention with other variables (see below) and the net effect of
external intervention would be to increase war duration.
Third, using  interaction  tenns,  we  also  explore the  effects of  intervention  in
ethnically diverse societies using interaction temis  (Phielf; Phielf2) as well as in wars
with high casualties, interacting the expected intervention regressor with the log of deaths
and displacements (Phico).  Only (Phielf) is found to be robustly significant, which has a
negative coefficient ranging from -.040 to -.054.
Fourth,  the  direct  effect  of  extreme  autocracy  is  negative  and  significant,
suggesting that more autocratic regimes can more easily quell rebellions.  At the same
time the lagged interaction term between extemal intervention and extreme autocracies
(Phidall)  is positive and significant with an estimated coefficient ranging from .52 to .6).
Thus, interventions in wars against extremely autocratic governments have the effect of
lengthening the war's duration.
Implications for  the Role of External Interventions and Extreme Autocracy?'I
For a given degree of ethnic fractionalization, external intervention will shift and
cause an upward shift in the inverted U-shaped hazard function and hence will increase
the duration of conflict for any given level of elf:  If we also account for the negative
effect due to the interaction term (Phielf), the hazard function should shift both upwards
as well as to the left. 12 This result corroborates one of the most important insights of our
model in  that  with  extemal  intervention, longer civil  wars can be  sustained even in
diverse (i.e. not polarized or ethnically-dominated) societies.  This finding would relax
the constraint that it takes ethnic polarization to produce long duration of conflict (Collier
et al. 1999).
11 In this section,  we discuss  relative  effects  of the different  variables  on war  duration. This  is an
incomplete  discussion  that  we intend  to expand  in the final  draft  of the paper.
12  In a subsequent version, we will conduct simulations to empirically derive these effects.
15Finally, autocracy (autoll)  is associated with shorter duration of conflicts while
external intervention under in  autocratic regimes (Phidall)  tends to be  associated with
longer-lasting  wars.  External  intervention  therefore  seems  to  generate  a  counter
balancing effect that possibly reduces an autocracy's  ability to quell a rebellion, leading
to longer wars.  The net effect is an empirical question, depending on the relative orders
of magnitude of the two opposing effects described here.
6.  Conclusion
This  paper  combines  an  empirical  model  of  external  intervention  with  a
theoretical model of civil war duration.  In doing so, it treats external intervention as an
endogenous variable and, contrary to previous studies, finds that external intervention is
positively associated with war duration.  This finding contradicts previous studies which
typically  argue that interventions may reduce the duration of the war (see,  e.g., Betts
1994).
The results presented in this paper are preliminary and need further testing and
elaboration.  In  future  revisions  of  this  paper,  we  intend  to  develop  the  theory  of
intervention by integrating various theoretical insights from the qualitative and case-study
literature.  We also intend to use duration analysis methods and build our data-set so that
we test the nuances of our model with greater accuracy.  Specifically, we want to acquire
data that allows us to discriminate between the type and target of the intervention  and
which provides us information on the timing of each of multiple interventions that may
have taken place in a single war.  In the current draft of the paper, we did not have access
to  such data and were  therefore unable to  develop our  analysis further.  We believe,
however, that the prelimninary  findings that we have presented in this draft, along with our
theoretical framework and the endogenization of the intervention variable are both useful
and encouraging and that they point to the need to question the theoretical and empirical
foundation of the argument that external partial intervention limits civil war duration, or
that ethnic polarization is the only significant determinant of long war duration.
Further research could usefully analyze and contrast the impact on war duration of
partial as opposed to impartial, multilateral interventions. Multilateral "peace" operations
should  be  distinguished from  partial  interventions by  their mandate  to  restore  peace
without taking sides.  Most of these operations tend to take place after wars end -- or at
least when a  cease-fire has been agreed-- so it may not be  feasible to  conduct a full-
fledged comparison to partial intervention with respect to their impact on war duration.
Such a comparison would be possible by concentrating on Chapter VII UN operations --
peace enforcement-- which typically do take sides according to the mandate assigned to
them by the Security Council.  Finally, in a revised version of this paper, we plan  to
conduct a study of war recurrence, as an additional section to this paper, where we will
16use war duration as an endogenous explanatory variable and will examine if partial third
party  interventions  --regardless  of  their  effect  on  war  duration--have  the  effect  of
increasing the risk of war recurrence.  If that is the case, then even if interventions do
reduce the length of civil wars, then they may be doing so at the cost of destabilizing the
political system further and sowing the seeds of future rebellion.
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